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Party Politics and the Poor: A Research Note 
Roger A. Lohmann1 
 
Why is it that some states make payments to public welfare recipients that are 
at least twice as large as those paid to recipients in some other states? On its face, 
the arbitrary unfairness of such conditions seems obvious yet little is being done to 
address the matter.  
Various explanations for this phenomenon have been advanced. One of the most 
widely held among political scientists is that the size of such payments reflect the 
different welfare orientations of the states – a political cultural explanation – and 
that these welfare orientations in turn are at least partly the result of differential 
levels of competition among and within political parties in each state. This 
explanation, first advanced in 1949, has recently been the subject of a great deal of 
controversy as well as a considerable outpouring of research by political scientists 
over the past two decades, and also a fair amount of criticism. Following up on the 
consequences of a statistical re-examination of this relationship for the fifty states  
by Dawson and Robinson (1963) more than half a dozen investigators have weighed 
in on the subject. They found a statistically significant relationship between party 
competition and welfare orientation but the effect disappeared when per capita 
income was controlled. This result was confirmed by Hofferbert (1966), who found 
no independent effects for any of the political variables he examined. Despite it’s 
obvious implications for public welfare practice and policy, social work researchers 
have ignored this research completely. 
The general trend of findings suggests rejecting any relationship between these 
two variables, and yet general unwillingness to do so has been grounded both in 
disciplinary and methodological concerns. In general, the effect of these studies has 
simply been to obscure the relationship and to render any possible conclusions 
indeterminate and to call for further needed research.  
Political Parties and Poverty 
The focus of this paper is explicitly interdisciplinary. It is directed at researchers 
interested in questions of social policy, public welfare practice, state government, 
and American political parties. Even though the research mentioned above, and the 
renaissance of interest in state politics it is part of,  has been conducted within a 
single discipline – political science – resolution of the issues raised has implications 
for a much broader interdisciplinary audience. While research in other disciplines, 
including sociology, anthropology and economics also could be brought to bear, the 
principal focus here will be limited to research in political science and “macro” social 
work – specifically social policy and social planning.  
 
1 At the time this was written, the author was an Assistant Professor, School of Social Work, University of 
Tennessee, Knoxville, TN. 
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The paper is an appeal for interdisciplinary, or short of that, multi-disciplinary 
inquiry on questions of the contemporary relationship between American political 
parties and the poor. I will attempt to demonstrate that a number of fruitful 
avenues of inquiry have been suggested and opened in the past but are presently 
subject to appropriate skepticism due to certain methodological and procedural 
weaknesses – some of them stemming from the use of statistical procedures 
requiring large and random samples on a universe of fifty cases.   
More definitive investigation of many of the underlying questions will be called 
for as a prelude to seeking viable alternatives for reforming the public welfare 
system.2 Opportunities for reform through the much vaunted – and much maligned 
– two party system are only a backdrop for the paper. The central focus here is on 
the social scientific question of the empirical relationships between political parties 
and poor people in our social world and specifically on the role of public welfare as 
one such linkage.  
Problem  
Following the “rediscovery” of poverty in the Kennedy years (1960-1963) and the 
initiation of the Johnson-era (1968-1968) War on Poverty (Kramer, 1969; Moynihan, 
1969; Sharkansky & Hofferbert, 1969; Spergel, 1972), there has been much recent 
interest in the social sciences on the question of the relationship between poverty 
and politics in American society. Although social workers and political scientists 
have, perhaps, the largest professional audiences on the subject, sociologists, 
anthropologists, economists, social psychologists and others from the liberal arts 
have also demonstrated interest in these questions at one point or another in recent 
years. Moreover, the issue has traversed the bounds of the conventional post-New 
Deal dialogues as both of America’s political parties have entered into the debate, 
along with activist reform groups like the National Welfare Rights Organization 
and professional trade associations including the American Medical Association, the 
American Bar Association and the National Association of Social Workers. During 
the past decade the question of politics and the poor has been largely dominated by 
national perspectives and Congressional proposals.  
Yet, several things stand out about the emerging consensus on welfare reform. 
First, it has focused almost exclusively on two levels of American government: the 
federal government and cities; leaving a third, and equally important – the states – 
entirely excluded. Secondly, there appears at times to be something approaching 
universal agreement – at least among the academic specialists involved – that the 
present welfare system is substantively and morally bankrupt and can only be 
 
2 From the perspective of someone reading this, it is obvious that the early, naive “policy sciences” 
orientation of this statement was completely ignored by actual policy-makers and that both the 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and later, Clinton-era welfare reforms were adopted on the basis of 
the actual political culture of elected legislators  – including a number of notable falsehoods. The very 
diversity of opinions among policy scientists appears to have mitigated any effects they might have had in 
the area of welfare reform. 
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replaced (Piven & Cloward, 1971). Thirdly, there is a kind of pious non-partisanship 
to all of these discussions that suggests (quite falsely, it turned out) that the issue of 
the poor transcends politics.  
The approach taken here is at variance with these points of apparent consensus. 
First, the focus is exclusively on the state level of government, politics and policy. 
Second, with the defeat of Nixonian proposals for welfare reform – specifically a 
national guaranteed annual income – it appears that the present public welfare 
system – including the newly established SSI program, which somehow escaped 
through that defeat – will be with us for the foreseeable future. Based on recent 
experience, we can assume that public welfare in our society is a profoundly 
political issue and one about which there is very little genuine consensus.3  
Today, just as a decade ago, when renewed interest in poverty arose, the single 
most important issue in a problem-ridden public welfare system is the generally, 
but inconsistently, low levels of payments to recipients in the majority of states. It 
is not accurate to assume that payments to all welfare recipients in all states are 
uniformly deficient. In fact, the second most important problem from a systematic 
standpoint is the enormous variability in payment levels. This variability was a 
principal rationale for the 1972 amendments creating the Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) program, which is a uniform, nationally administered program of the 
Social Security Administration established to replace the categorial state programs 
for the Aged, Blind and Disabled. However, the variability still remains for the most 
controversial Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and there is 
growing evidence that variability continues to be an issue both in state-supplements 
of SSI and in the Medicaid program.  
The principal implications of this are as simple as they are profound: If, in fact, 
recipients in one state receive on average less than half of what recipients in some 
other state receive and the difference is not related to cost-of-living differences 
between those states, is there not a strong case that citizens are being treated 
differently by their government in violation of the equal protection clause of the 
U.S. Constitution? The political challenge is whether the general will exists to face 
up to these challenges. Although there are major legal and constitutional issues 
involved here, equally important is the empirical question of the political cause(s) to 
which these systematic differences can be attributed. Since it is a causal connection 
that is sought, we might initially set forth the parameters of that term as it is 
usually employed in the social sciences. First, in order for any factor we seek to 
attribute as causal to be plausible, it must precede in time the factor which it 
explains. Secondly, there must be a real, discernable (that is, meaningful) 
relationship between any cause and its effect.  
The contemporary explanations of this phenomenon in the published literature 
can be divided into two broad categories. Both of these are causal explanations 
 
3 Note that this statement conforms closely to Benjamin Barber’s later (1988) philosophical definition of 
politics as arising under two conditions: public good and uncertainty.  
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grounded in statistical correlations. On the one hand, there are the social order 
explanations that identify some differentiating characteristics of the social orders of 
sub-national jurisdictions – states or localities – as the causal factor accounting for 
the differentials in welfare payments.  The other are the social organization 
explanations, which identify some characteristic s of the organizations, associations 
or groups to which persons in the various jurisdictions may belong as causal factors. 
An example of the first is the commonly held urbanization-industrialization 
orientation which links higher levels of welfare orientation to industrial cities, and 
lower levels to agricultural and rural areas. The second is associated with the 
approach under consideration here: the inter-party competition hypothesis. Where 
parties (or factions within parties) are more competitive, welfare orientations will 
be higher, and where they are less competitive they will be lower.  
It must be noted here that the issue has too often been approached as an either-
or proposition in which social order explanations are pitted directly against social 
organization explanations. However, the evidence offered by any of the 
investigations to the present is not sufficiently convincing in one direction or the 
other, and further there are serious methodological implications involved in such a 
head to head comparison. One of the possibilities that deserves more attention than 
it has received is a multi-variate model in which both social order and social 
explanations contribute jointly to a composite impact on welfare orientations.  
The Party Competition Hypothesis 
One of the earliest formulation of the causes of variations in welfare payments 
was outlined by the late political scientist V.O. Key Jr., in his class study of 
Southern Politics in State and Nation (1949). Two decades later Cnudde & McCrone 
summarized Key’s initial argument thus: 
Key sees the degree of party competition as crucial because it reflects the the 
extent to which politics is organized or unorganized. Party competition, by 
producing some semblance of an organized politics lessens the difficulty of 
lower status groups in sorting out political actors and issues, thereby 
enabling them to promote their own interests more effectively…” (Cnudde & 
McCrone, 1969) 
Several implicit assumptions and apparent assertions of Key’s approach are 
worth noting. First is the use of party competition of an indicator, or index of the 
level of political organization in a state. Secondly, there would appear to be an 
assumption that the poor everywhere seem to adequately promote their own 
interest politically and that this is, in some manner, directly responsible for more 
satisfactory welfare payment levels in some instances. This assumption is 
seemingly contradicted by lower rates of voting and political participation 
individually and in associations.  
This assumption has a good deal in common with pluralist approaches to power 
elites and with “modal voter” arguments. The assumption that all citizens in a 
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democracy have pretty much the same ability to affect policy outcomes has been 
seriously challenged by a range of studies by C. Wright Mills and others (Mills, 
1963).  
Further, Key’s approach fails to systematically account for (or dismiss) a range 
of social order variables that have been shown to be relevant in other studies (C.f., 
Dye, 1966; Piven & Cloward, 1971; Wilensky & LeBeaux, 1965). In particular, two 
social order explanations are not sufficiently explored or discounted: the role of 
federalism; and the political economies of individual states. Focus on party 
competition as a determinative factor also seems to discount rival hypotheses of 
political organization; specifically, the role of interest groups and public 
bureaucracies. All state welfare departments cannot be assumed to be equal in the 
defense and advocacy of the programs before legislative bodies and in budget 
negotiations with their respective governors’ offices, for example. 
In addition, the Key approach demonstrates certain measurement weaknesses. 
Statistically, the resultant models fail to satisfactorily control for possible spurious 
correlations. There is also a heavy reliance on standard, social indicator-type data.  
The central premise of the Key approach seems to be that in situations of 
political competition, state politicians will seek the support of the poor by promising 
and then delivering higher welfare payments. In general, this premise lacks face 
validity and it is difficult to identify state-level examples where this has occurred or 
is occurring. It is far more likely that such discussions and debates have and will 
continue to occur among political elites and that any influence of party competition 
will be mediated through competition among those elites.  
Conclusion 
The issue of the causes of the extreme variations that exist among the American 
states in the levels of welfare payments is obviously a very important one. It is also 
clear that no satisfactory explanations – not the interparty competition thesis nor 
the various social order explanations adequately explain these variations. What is 
needed is a model of a multi-variate explanations which combines both social order 
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